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Abstract   This paper examines how local forestry management has evolved in the 
Aı¨t Bougmez Valley (Central High Atlas, Morocco) in the last three decades and how 
this evolution  has affected  forest ecosystem conditions. It  focuses on the impact 
of the forestry administration on ‘traditional forestry management’ since its 
introduction in 1985, and of recent innovation in forestry policy. The relatively new 
Strategic Environmental Management Analysis (SEMA) framework is applied, rather 
than a more ‘classical’ new institutional framework. This approach allows for a more 
comprehensive understanding of both strategic interactions between various actors 
and ecological consequences of these interactions. An interesting empirical findings 
is that instead of a quite simple opposition between the forestry adminis- tration 
and local populations, negotiation opportunities exist that are taken by the actors. 
This leads to specific actor configurations and sometimes unexpected envi- 
ronmental outcomes, even if from a global point of view, forest stands have been 
seriously depleted over the last 40 years mainly due to exploitation by local pop- 
ulation and the absence of economic alternative to forest exploitation. On the other 
hand, the implementation of a new policy tool in such a context has to be understood 
as an opportunity for new actors to take part in forest management rules definition. 
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Introduction 
 
Over the last three decades, the role of local communities in natural resources 
conservation has been more and more widely recognized. Since the 1990, a large part  
of  the  scientific  literature  devoted  to  natural  resource  management  in developing 
countries has thus focused on local communities’ capacities to manage carefully their 
resources through specific institutions (Ostrom 1990; Baland and Plateau  1996; 
Agrawal 2001). It  has been  shown in  several  countries that  the intervention of 
the state has led to a loss of legitimacy of these local institutions, which in turn has 
provoked severe degradation, particularly in the forest sector (Auclair 1998). To 
overcome this problem, recognition of local institutions and devolution of forest 
resources management and access rights to local communities has become an 
important issue (Behera and Engel 2006). Taking into account the fact that the 
forestry administration and local communities were already interacting together, 
authors such as Baland and Plateau (1996) have rather called for a co- management 
regime where they both have rights and responsabilities. 
The  Moroccan  Forestry  Administration,  which  is  known  to  have  had  a 
centralised, hierarchical and coercive approach to forestry management over the years 
(Davis 2007), now claims to have adopted this idea. The policy for attaining it is 
defined in the National Forest Program
1 1
(NFP), approved in 1999 (MCEF 1999). As 
a first implementation step, a ministerial decree on compensation of exclusion of 
grazing animals was issued in 1999. This decree is said to be a major tool towards 
the establishment of partnerships between the forestry administration and local 
populations (MCEF 2002). Such partnerships are supposed to result in better forest 
conservation and local population participation. 
In the central High Atlas, forest depletion is a major problem for the forestry 
administration which has always considered its protection as a major objective. These 
mountain forests are also intensively exploited by local populations as an important 
part of their livelihood, and forest exploitation is submitted to several rules 
designed by the populations themselves. One of these rules, called agdal, has been 
studied by pastoralists and experts of ‘common property’; it aims to preserve forest 
and pasture by preventing their exploitation for a specified period (Lecestre- Rollier 
1992; Auclair 1996). The practices, implemented by established local institutions and 
structures, are supported by empirical ecological knowledge and have ecological 
impacts (Hammi et al. 2007). 
This paper focuses on the case of the Aı¨t Bougmez Valley, in the central High 
Atlas. Its objective is to shed light on the historical evolution of interaction patterns 
between the forestry administration and the local population, its ecological 
consequences and how the new policy tool (the decree on compensation for exclusion 
of grazing animals) is likely to provoke any change. The analysis utilizes the  
Strategic Environmental Management Assessment framework (described by 
                                                          
1 1   A National Forest Program has been defined as ‘generic expression for a wide range of approaches to 
the process of planning, programming and implementing forest activities in countries’ (CSD-IPF 1996, 
para. 25, in Schanz 2002, p. 269) 
 
  
 
 
Mermet et al. 2005). Use of this theoretical framework to analyse the evolution of 
local forest management brings into debate the ‘common property resources 
paradigm’, which has become the standard model for analysing natural resources 
management  over the  last  decade,  especially in  developing countries (Johnson 
2004). 
The next section discusses the interest of the Strategic Environmental Manage- 
ment Assessment framework compared to what can be called the ‘common property 
resources paradigm’2  (e.g. Ostrom 1990) and presents the research method. The 
case study area of the Aı¨t Bougmez Valley is then described. Next, local forestry 
management before the forestry administration arrival in the valley, and the impact 
of this arrival on local forestry management, are analysed. Changes in forest policy 
and the forestry administration’s ability to develop a partnership with the emergent 
local associations are questioned. Concluding comments follow. 
 
 
Theoretical Framework and Research  Method 
 
Rejecting and in many case disproving Hardin’s famous parable (1968), ‘commons 
scholars’ have documented over the last 20 years literally thousands of cases in 
which people have been able to create, maintain or re-organize common property. 
As noted by Johnson (2004), it would be no exaggeration to say that nowadays, this 
theoretical framework has come to largely dominate the scientific literature about 
natural resources management, especially in developing countries. At the centre of 
this school of thought is the idea that institutional arrangements––and particularly 
property rights––influence to a great extent the way people use and manage natural 
resources, and that particular institutional configurations can positively influence 
resource conservation. A set of institutional ‘design principles’ has been derived from 
the numerous empirical studies mentioned above; the more an institutional 
arrangement is in accordance with these principles, the more likely it is to result in 
sustainable management of natural resources. 
Following Ostrom (1990, p. 51), these institutions have to be understood as ‘the 
set of working rules […] that  forbid, permit  or require’; and their creation  or 
evolution has to be apprehended as the result of rational choices made by individuals, 
themselves informed by (i) their discount rate and moral norm, especially regarding 
the group of which they are a part, and (ii) the potential costs and benefits from a 
rule change in matters of natural resource management (Ostrom 
1990, p. 37). This framework has been particularly useful over the last two decades 
to discuss several empirical cases and theorizes the conditions under which collective 
action can lead to sustainable natural resources management. 
In  the  research  reported  here,  the  aim  is  however not  to  inform  about  the 
potentiality for collective action to emerge or maintain, but to shed light on the 
evolution of interaction patterns between an external actor––the forestry adminis- 
tration, represented by a forest guard––and local communities, and the ecological 
 
 
 
2   It is acknowledged that a great diversity exists in the literature devoted to the study of the common 
property, as noted by Hautdidier (2007).
  
 
 
 
 
consequences of these interactions. In such a perspective, there are at least two 
reasons to mobilize a different framework. 
First, it seems important to take better account of the power relationship that link 
actors  together  and  bring  them  to  negotiate  each  others  behaviour, instead  of 
focusing mainly on the institutions. In this perspective, the power is seen as a 
component of the relationship and not as a personal attribute; it cannot be separated 
from the relationship through which it exists (Friedberg 1997 [1993], p. 123). Actors 
can however benefit from unequally distributed resources, which often leads to 
asymmetrical relationships (Chazel 1983). 
Second, when focusing on local  institutional  arrangements––as the  common 
property analytical framework leads the researcher to do––the environmental 
component is often disregarded. What is seen as good forest or natural resources 
governance (i.e. in accordance with most of the design principles enounced by 
scholars of the commons) is too easily said to result necessarily in better 
environmental outcomes. It  seems necessary however to  keep  in  mind  a  clear 
reference to the quality of the ecosystems involved, if a so-called ‘sustainable’ 
management of forest has to be reached. To do so, the definition of ecological 
indicators is needed; this study relies mainly on an important work of Hammi et al. 
(2007) which assesses the evolution of tree cover fraction over the last 40 years 
through diachronic analysis of aerial photography. 
To take  into  account  these  two critical  remarks, a  more strategic  analytical 
framework that focuses also on ecological outputs of actors interactions is needed 
such as the Strategic Environmental Management Analysis (SEMA) framework. This  
framework  allows  environmental  management  situations  to  be  analysed through 
three different and complementary perspectives––normative, analytic, and strategic–
–to answer an apparently simple question: how can the environmental management 
of a particular ecosystem be improved (Mermet et al. 2005; Mermet 
2006). This framework has in particular been used to analyse the link between local 
management and public action in developing countries (Leroy 2006; Leroy et al. 
2006; Taravella 2008). In the case of the Aı¨t Bougmez forests, such a framework led 
to: 
 
• the  choice  of  indicators  through  which  indicators  forest  quality  has  to  be 
assessed, 
• an understanding of how the various actors involved in forest management had 
been acting and interacting, and interact today, and of the ecological 
consequences of these interactions, 
• insights into the extent to which a change in the actor configuration––if any 
change is to occur––can produce significant ecological outcomes, according to 
the indicator chosen. 
 
This paper focuses particularly on the second and third point and relies on work 
of Hammi et al. (2007) and Cordier (2007) to discuss the first point. Management of 
forests by the local population before the forest guard’s arrival is derived from 
previous studies in the Aı¨t Bougmez valley, particularly Lecestre-Rollier (1986, 
1992) and Auclair (1991, 1996).
  
 
 
 
 
Comprehensive fieldwork has been conducted for one year in the Aı¨t Bougmez 
Valley to assess current interaction patterns between the forestry administration and 
the local population and possible change in actor configuration (both in the forestry 
administration and in the local organization). Sixty-nine interviews were carried out 
at  the  local  level,  which  concentrated  on  local  practices  and  ‘autochthonous’ 
forestry management rule definitions and enforcement, forest guard intervention and 
forestry law enforcement, as well as emergence of new associations. These 
interviews followed a semi-structured guide, and comprised: 
 
(i)    40 interviews with smallholders and village leaders; 
(ii)    nine interviews with the Aı¨t Bougmez forest guard and local managers and 
engineers of the forestry administration; 
(iii)   20 interviews with local NGOs leaders. 
 
At national level, 19 interviews were conducted to understand recent changes in 
forest policy and the way these changes can be put into practice, particularly in the 
case of the Aı¨t Bougmez valley. Persons interviewed were all more or less directly 
involved in forest policies formulation, including high-ranking members of the 
forestry administration (10 interviews), and national and international experts or 
professors working as experts for the administration (nine interviews). 
 
 
The Aı¨t Bougmez Valley Case Study 
 
The Ait Bouguemez Valley is located in the Central High Atlas in the Azilal 
province. The valley is about 30 km long with an altitude ranging from 1,800 to 
2,200 m,  delimited  in  the  north  and  south  by  high  mountain  ranges  reaching 
3,700 m  (see Fig. 1). Approximately 30 villages are  located  in  the  valley,  the 
territories of which are organised perpendicularly to the mountain axis. One can 
find, from the lower valley upwards, irrigated crops, villages, and some plots of 
dryland cultivation. The middle and high parts of the slopes are wooded areas. 
Forest  covers  about  12,000 ha,  and  irrigated  crops  almost  2,000 ha  which 
constitutes one of the largest irrigated area of the whole High Atlas and partially 
explains the relative richness of the Aı¨t Bougmez valley compared to the rest of the 
mountain. The  other  territory  is asylvatic spaces at  high altitude  composed of 
collective grazing for ovine and caprine flocks. Basically, the agrarian economy of 
Aı¨t Bougmez relies on the complementarity between various resources (farm crops, 
irrigation water, pasture land and forests) among which forests plays a major role by 
providing fodder and firewood during winter, and house-building wood and grazing 
areas for sheep and goats. 
Several changes have occurred during the last two decades, which have profoundly 
altered the valley by bringing it closer to ‘the rest of the world’. Azilal, the  closest  
large  town,  is  a  2.5 h  drive  from  Marrakech  and  currently  has  a population of 
27,700 inhabitants. The road from Azilal to the valley was constructed in 2001 and 
takes a further two hours to negotiate. About two-thirds of the subsequent roads into 
the valley which provide access to the villages are rough
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1  Location of the Aı¨t Bougmez Valley (reproduced with permission of Sanae Hammi) 
 
 
tracks. Electricity was brought to all the villages in 2002 and cell phones became 
operational in 2003. 
New economic activities have also appeared in the last 20 years, including the 
development of commercial agriculture of apples and potatoes and the development 
of tourism, the latter thanks to a project launched at the beginning of the 80s and 
founded with French cooperation support. These activities were not immediately of 
interest to people, but they have gained growing attention over recent years. Now, 
their contribution to the income of most families cannot be neglected, especially in 
the lower part of the valley. Crucially, the population has almost doubled from 1960 
to 2004, from 6,778 inhabitants to more than 13,000. 
 
 
Local Forestry Management Before Arrival  of the Forestry Administration 
 
Theoretically, forestry management in Morocco is governed by the forestry code, 
which derives from the Dahir relatif a` la protection et a` l’exploitation des foreˆts 
(Law of Forest Protection and Exploitation) issued under French protectorate in 
1917. This code presumes each forest stand to be state property and therefore 
subjected to severe restrictions by the forestry administration. 
In Aı¨t Bougmez, the legislation was not enforced until the posting of a permanent 
forest guard in 1985. As observed by Lecestre-Rollier (1992), who carried out
  
 
 
 
 
extensive research in the valley before this date, forestry management was based on 
complex property rights and autochthonous regulation. 
Village assemblies (called Jmaˆa in Berber language) define the rules concerning 
forest resource exploitation, in terms of amount of firewood, fodder and timber that 
can be cut per family, period of withdrawal and sometimes resource cost (for timber 
only). One of the most important rules enforced by villagers is the agdal one. The 
term agdal  refers to an area, a resource and the rules laid down to manage this 
resource-space (Auclair et al. 2006). Agdal forest is forest where cutting branches 
or trees is strictly forbidden throughout the year except in cases of heavy snowfall or 
when somebody needs wood to build a house. But grazing of sheep and goats is 
always allowed. Outside the agdal, other rules exist and are defined by the village 
assembly. When somebody breaks one of the rules concerning a village forest, they 
are fined an amount of up to 200 Dirhams,
3  
which has to be paid to the village. 
Forest stands further from the villages may also be exploited by several villages 
(generally no more than two or three). Some rules may exist but not necessarily, 
depending on the relationships between villages that share the resource. 
More generally, forests are all appropriated by the local population and no open 
access forests exist. The definition and delimitation of village forest territories has 
however been subject to several conflicts between villages in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s, as reported by Lecestre-Rollier (1986). Each village now has access to 
forests, which are from 100 to 200 ha in size, with a few larger forests including that 
of Ighirine village, in the upper part of the valley. 
Forestry management by the local population appears to have been a kind of 
‘perfect’ case study for the scholars of common property. It resembles most of the 
accepted institutional design principles mentioned above that are considered to be 
important  for sustainable resource management  (Ostrom 1990; Romagny et  al. 
2008). However, from an environmental point of view and according to Lecestre- 
Rollier  (1992),  this  collective  management  was  insufficient to  preserve  forest 
stands, which were already suffering severe depletion. Moreover, this local 
management was challenged by the forest guard on his arrival in the valley, who had 
to enforce a forestry law incompatible with local practices. 
Two questions must be raised following these statements: ‘How was the forestry 
law enforced in such a context?’ and ‘Was the forestry administration able to draw 
upon this ‘collective control’ over forest stands to improve forest management 
towards less degradation?’. 
 
 
Negotiating  the Forest  Management Rules: Interaction Patterns Between 
Local Communities  and the Forestry Administration 
 
Moroccan forestry law considers all natural forest stands to be state property. There 
is a total ban on felling of trees for firewood or building, collecting fodder and 
grazing goats, activities of central importance in the Aı¨t Bougmez economy. Only 
few land rights are given to users: they are allowed to collect on-the-ground dead 
 
  
 
 
3   In comparison, an agricultural worker earns 50 to 70 Dirhams a day; 10 Dh is about 1.15 US $. 
 
wood and grazing is limited to the ‘family’ livestock, i.e. no more animals than the 
family actually needs to live on, goats excluded. On arrival of the forest guard in 
1985, a strict enforcement of the law was thus obviously impossible, especially taking 
into consideration the forest area he had to control, of more than 12,000 ha. Lecestre-
Rollier (1992) observed that his arrival was totally ineffective: people continued to 
exploit their forest as usual according to their own rules––they just cut wood more 
discreetly and often during the night. Few fines were imposed although everybody 
was breaking the law and local people commented casually that ‘the forest guard 
can’t do anything’. 
Local rules were thus not really changed. But the existence of a double system 
(local and ‘legal’) was seen by Lecestre-Rollier (1992) as a breach in the local 
management system, which could have important consequences. Indeed, 20 years 
later, the data collected for this study show that several changes have occurred in 
local forestry management, some of which are directly due to forestry administra- 
tion intervention: 
 
• Forest areas controlled by villages have decreased because of replanting by the 
forestry  administration.  Between  1985  and  2007,  more  than  2400 ha  were 
replanted across the whole valley (which amounts to about 12,000 ha of forest). 
After reforestation, an area is considered to definitely belong to the forestry 
administration whereas other forest stands are generally considered by villagers 
as their forest. Reforestation areas are often located over stands claimed by two 
or more villages. Replanting offers an arbitrary solution in areas where previously 
there may have been an inter-village dispute over the ownership of a particular 
stand. The stand becomes state forest, and the dispute therefore no longer exists. 
• In villages which control a large forest area (and therefore important forest 
resources), autochthonous rules are not really modified by the forest guard’s 
intervention. However, each time wood is needed (for construction, fodder or 
firewood), villagers need his ‘authorisation’ and have to give him a bribe.4 
• Among these villages, traditional institutions have sometimes lost a part of their 
local legitimacy in forest exploitation regulation. This is the case for the villages 
of Aı¨t Imi, Iskattafen and Aguerd’n’Ouzrou. Because forestry management has 
become by law the forestry administration’s task, a growing number of people 
no longer comply with village rules. Villagers prefer to deal directly with the 
forest guard, in particular in situations where they know that the amount of wood 
that they wish to obtain is not likely to be accepted by Jmaˆa: ‘before the forest 
guard arrived, agdal were well managed in our village. But now, most of people 
deal directly with him [the forest guard] and they don’t care anymore about village 
rules’ (interview with a village leader, village of Aı¨t Imi, 2006). 
• Finally, in villages which do not have much forest and which are close to the 
road (so that it is easy for the forest guard to monitor the forest), forest 
exploitation has been almost totally forbidden by the guard, who does not accept 
 
4   For example, before winter, each village collects between 1000 and 3000 Dirhams and give it to the 
forest guard to be able to gather firewood during three months (between December and February). Each 
household has thus to give 50 to 100 Dihams.
  
 
 
 
any bribes. This concerns essentially villages located in the lower part of the 
valley (of Timit and Aı¨t Ziri), where this kind of restriction is easier to enforce 
thanks to major changes in the farming system. The development of tourism and 
commercial agriculture (apples and potatoes) makes butane gas affordable to a 
growing number of  families,  reducing the  demand  for  fuelwood. Also, the 
decline of pastoralism reduces the need to cut tree leaves during winter for fodder, 
and as a result of income augmentation families are able to buy cereals (including 
barley and oats) as an alternative to tree fodder. However, obtaining some 
firewood to warm the houses during the winter remains necessary even in this 
part of the valley because fire is the only option to heat houses. 
 
These  few  examples  illustrate  how  specific negotiations  take  place  in  each 
village, through which both autochthonous rules and the forestry law are redefined. 
This produces particular and contingent local orders
5 
that link together villagers and 
the  forest guard; their  relationship is however marked  by an  unequal resource 
distribution which leads to distributive negotiations (Walton and McKersie 1991 
[1965]); indeed, the forest guard has the legal authority and benefits from it. In 
contrast, most villagers need to obtain wood or fodder from the forest and have no 
alternative than to negotiate from an unfavourable position. But the forestry 
administration also plays an important role in mediating conflicts between villages 
through reforestation that is located over stands claimed by two or more villages. 
These examples also show that the forest guard takes into account––to some 
extent––the existing local rules in the negotiation. These rules are indeed not totally 
ignored or rejected but rather re-defined through specific negotiations. More 
generally, most forest guards who have worked in the valley as well as the forest 
engineer responsible for the Aı¨t Bougmez forest know about local rules and 
especially agdal practices and acknowledge some respect for it: ‘[Agdal practices] 
are good things for me. That people want to use the territory in a rational way, it’s 
really good. I consider this as sustainable development’ (interview with a forest 
engineer, May 2006); ‘in certain forests of the Province (Aı¨t Bougmez), […] forest 
stands  are  carefully  managed  under  collective control’  (forestry administration 
report about forestry management in Azilal province - MARA 1986, annexe 5.2, 
p. 10). They however don’t recognize it officially which would lead them to loose a 
strategic advantage to negotiate with local population. 
Despite this situation, new national forestry orientations tend toward the idea that 
recognition of local practices and co-management with local population would be 
able to improve environmental outcomes of forestry management. Before defining 
more precisely these ‘new’ orientations, and following the analytical framework 
chosen for this case study, one needs to know better the ecological consequences of 
the evolving forest management system underlined. Some of these consequences 
include: 
 
• In the upper part of the valley where a diachronic analysis of forest cover 
evolution between 1964 and 2002 was carried out, 20% of the previous forest area 
of 1964 has been totally deforested, which represents a loss of 1,200 ha or 
 
5   Crozier and Friedberg (1977) and Friedberg (1997) elaborate the specific notion of ‘local order’.
  
 
 
 
8%  of  forest  cover  (Hammi  et al.  2007).  In  most  villages,  forest  product 
withdrawal has increased (except for the few where it has been totally forbidden 
by the forest guard) and almost all non-agdal forest stands have suffered severe 
degradation. 
• Agdal forest stands have been better protected. Indeed, over the last four decades 
mean tree cover has increased from 15.8% to 18.9%, (Hammi et al. 2007). 
Cordier  (2007)  showed  that  forest  product  withdrawal inside  of  agdal,  for 
fodder, firewood or timber, is done by local population with a high empirical 
knowledge of ecological processes that, in most cases, allows forest stands to 
regenerate and trees to stay alive despite the high degree of exploitation to which 
they are submitted. Cordier also showed how regeneration depends not only on 
management rules and practices but also on ecological conditions (including 
gradient of slopes, soil conditions, exposition and confinement). 
• Finally, some areas have been reforested by the forestry administration, which 
means a relative augmentation of forested area (relative because other parts have 
been deforested during the same period). About 2,500 ha have been replanted, 
among which approximately 1,500 have succeeded (though most is at an early 
stage of growth and cannot yet be called forest stands). Because reforestation 
has mostly been with exotic species of Cupressus arizonica (almost 70%), and 
semi-autochtonous  species  including  Pinus  halepensis  and  Pinus  pinaster 
(which are indigenous in Morocco but not originally in Aı¨t Bougmez Valley) for 
which regeneration is almost absent at present, the future of these new forest 
stands is uncertain. 
 
These  results  take  into  account  three  important  considerations. First,  forest 
degradation has definitely occurred and is still continuing in the Aı¨t Bougmez Valley, 
mainly due to the intense exploitation. This degradation is however shaped by local 
rules and the way they are continuously re-defined through specific negotiations with 
the forestry administration; it has indeed been shown that agdal forests have been 
greatly protected whereas non-agdal stands have been almost totally deforested. 
Finally, the forestry administration intervention has had an impact through the 
redefinition of ‘traditional rules’ but that cannot be assessed using diachronic analysis 
and a tree cover fraction evolution indicator. However, the redefinition of these rules 
is mainly the consequence of distributive negotiations. These distributive negotiations 
result themselves––at least partly––from the non-recognition by the forestry 
administration of local population legitimacy to intervene in forestry management. 
Will a policy that takes into account the local population as a legitimate interlocutor 
be able to change the Aı¨t Bougmez management system and particularly with regard 
to its environmental outcomes? To answer such a question, it is first necessary to 
understand more precisely these policy evolutions. 
 
 
The Evolution of Forest  Policy: From  Distributive  Negotiation to Partnership? 
 
Most officials that were interviewed said the forestry administration has evolved 
substantially since the mid-1980s, and now attempts to take into account the local
  
 
 
 
population’s wishes, consider rural poverty before forbidding everything, and seek 
alternatives to repressive approaches. These ideas are expressed in several strategic 
plans and programs produced by the administration between 1986 and now. They 
have been integrated into the National Forest Programme (NFP) adopted in 1999. 
This program promotes ‘a new approach  which combines strategic planning, and 
long term, decentralised and participative processes [which are] necessary to 
improve the success rate of projects’; furthermore, the new forestry policy has ‘to 
improve livelihood and incomes of rural populations through … a rational, 
sustainable,  and  participatory  management of natural  resources’  (MCEF 1999, 
p.77). 
Two key ideas can summarize the new policy orientations: first, the forestry 
administration agent has to work as a development agent if he wants forests to be 
conserved, and second, he has to set up participatory processes to be successful. Both 
ideas are however not so new in this administration, as Aubert (in press) has shown, 
and have never been enforced in Aı¨t Bougmez. At least two reasons can explain this 
lack of enforcement: 
 
• These ideas have never been ratified. Moroccan forest code remains similar to 
the original dahir of 1917, and its coercive vision of forestry
6
; Moroccan forestry 
administration  agents are  therefore asked to  manage  forest areas  through a 
participatory process without the tools to do so. Moreover, most of them still 
have in mind the idea, promoted during the time of the French protectorate, that 
forest appropriation by the state and creation of the forestry administration was 
necessary to restore the great  Moroccan forest depleted by rural populations 
whose ignorance about natural resources management was total
7  
(Davis 2007). 
• As shown in the Aı¨t Bougmez Valley (and reported by several other authors 
including Fay 1986; Aderdar, 2000 and Aı¨t Hamza et al., 2007), the relationship 
between the forestry administration and villagers is based on both mistrust and 
distributive negotiation; this hinders the establishment of a new kind of 
partnership between them. 
 
In spite of this situation, a ministerial decree proposing compensation for 
exclusion of grazing animals was issued in 1999, and is presented both as the first 
step of NFP implementation and as a new tool to put into practice partnerships with 
the local population (MCEF 2002). The application order for this decree was issued 
in 2002, but the decree only took effect in 2006 in the Mid Atlas, and the first 
experience has just been launched in the High Atlas. The decree aims to prevent 
 
 
 
 
6   A law about people participation in forest management and economy was issued in 1976, but did not 
have the intended impact mainly because its application order was never issued and it promoted the rural 
district as new partners for foresters but totally forgot the tribal communities (MCEF 1999). 
7   Boulhol (1952, p. 233) gives a  particularly good example of the  common discourse about rural 
population at the time of the protectorate: ‘before 1912 [the time French protectorate began in Morocco], 
anarchy reigned over Morocco …: even if in certain area, rural population seemed to respect common 
property  on  forest  stand––rather  than  domanial  one––while abusing  of it,  it  was  most often that 
especially in the Berber mountain, the peasant cut the forest to make his field.’.
  
 
 
 
people from grazing cattle in regeneration stands
8 
by offering them compensation of 
250 dirhams per hectare per year,
9 
on condition that they organise themselves into a 
formal  association  (under  the  1958  law).  The  monetary  compensation  is  an 
incentive to respect grazing restrictions and to allow the forest to regenerate. 
In concrete terms, the decree application led to the establishment of a contract 
between the forest administration and the association, of which neither the terms of 
reference nor the objectives were negotiable. Despite these ‘defaults’, this decree is 
currently  the  only  tool  available  to  the  forest  administration  to  evolve  its 
relationship with the local population. 
How could this decree be applied and how could it change any aspects of local 
forestry management? This question will be answered by analysing how associ- 
ations have  emerged  and  what  they  do today  in  the  valley,  focusing on their 
relationships with both traditional institutions and the forest administration. The 
associations’ capacity to take part in local forestry management through either the 
implementation of the ministerial decree or the re-formalization of traditional 
management at the village scale will then be discussed. 
 
 
Local NGOs and Their  Participation in Forest  Management 
 
Since 1998, almost 30 associations have been created in the Aı¨t Bougmez Valley, 
more than 50% in the last two years. Looking at their statutes and the projects they 
have developed up to now, Bougmez’ associations mostly work on local and social 
development through specific actions: literacy training, water reservoir construction, 
health education, and women development promotion through gender approach. All 
their activities are financed by external donations, projects such as the National 
Initiative for Human Development (launched in 2005 by King Mohammed VI) and 
diverse rural development projects (conducted by the World Bank and a French 
non-governmental organisation called ‘Agronome et Ve´te´rinaire Sans Frontie`re’). 
The emergence of local associations is linked with (i) the existence of a 
development rent created by international development aid and national policies for 
rural development, from which associations attempt to benefit (as described by 
Bierschenk et al. 2000), (ii) the increasing desire of the Moroccan state to work 
closely with local associations, ‘in order to concretise the new proximity policy 
 
8   Exclusion of grazing animals has often been presented as the panacea for forest conservation all over 
Morocco (Davis 2007). Sheep and goats damage forest stands by eating young parts of trees and young 
trees. Promoting exclusion of grazing animals therefore offers the potential to favour forest regeneration. 
However, without denying the importance of reducing grazing in forest stands in most cases, other 
ecological parameters can sometimes better explain forest regeneration. Comparing two stands submitted 
to the same management practices and pastoral pressure, Cordier (2007, pp. 50–54) found an abundant 
regeneration in the first one but almost none in the second. The first stand benefited from better ecological 
conditions due to its location in an area where the humidity and cold air mass accumulate (Rhanem 1985), 
allowing more rapid regeneration growth. 
9   The value of the compensation has been calculated by estimating the average amount of forage that can 
be yielded from an hectare of forest in Morocco in one year. This amount was calculated to be equivalent 
to 250 kg of barley. At the time the application order was issued (2002), 1 kg of barley was priced at 
nearly 1 Dh; it was therefore decided to fix the compensation value at 250 Dh/ha/year.
  
 
 
 
which aims at fighting poverty and improving livelihood’ (Royaume du Maroc 
2003, p. 1), and (iii) more generally the growing interest for civil society expressed 
by international donors and NGOs in Morocco (Mernissi 1997). 
The  movement  started  with associations, which wanted to  work on a  large 
scale, but recently created associations are mainly village associations, with the scope 
of their action not going beyond the village scale. Associations now exist in more 
than 50% of Aı¨t Bougmez villages. Indeed, the first associations created pretended 
to work at a multiple-village scale but were said to privilege the village from which 
they came. People from other villages decided to create their own associations to 
ensure they gained benefit from interesting projects: ‘Other associations have never 
done anything for our village; that’s why we’ve decided to create our own one’ 
(association leader, Tabant village in Aı¨t Bougmez). And villages have copied each 
other: ‘we saw that other villages developed projects thanks to  an  association,  
whereas  we didn’t have  anything. That’s why we’ve decided to create  this 
association’ (association leader, Aı¨t Ouham village in Aı¨t Bougmez). 
In such a context, the implementation of the ministerial decree on compensation 
of exclusion of grazing animals––which relies on the existence of local associa- tion–
–could be thought to be relatively easy. At the end of 2006, the forestry 
administration district of Azilal expressed the wish to put it into practice (interview 
with a forest engineer in Azilal, May 2006). However, during the last two years, the 
administration has not contacted any local association in the valley but rather has 
attempted to implement the ministerial decree by creating a new association 
especially dedicated to this purpose, in the village of Ighirine-Iglouane. Moreover, 
the forest engineer in charge of the Aı¨t Bougmez forest, located around 80 km from 
the valley, had never heard about local associations before launching this experiment. 
Despite its claims, the forestry administration (at least the service of the Azilal 
province, where the Aı¨t Bougmez Valley is located) seems thus to keep quite a 
vertical approach of forest management. As a consequence, none of the associations 
mentioned above has been in contact with the forestry administration until now and 
they even ignore the existence of the decree about compensation for exclusion of 
grazing animals. 
Focusing on the current experiment in the village of Ighirine-Iglouane, some key 
conclusions can be derived. First, discussions have only been conduced between the 
president of  the  newly created association and the  Azilal  forest engineer.  The 
president is a young teacher from the village who is especially engaged in local NGO 
emergence. He is typically what Olivier de Sardan (2005, p. 174) calls a 
‘broker’: a social actor involved in a local arena that tries to play the role of 
intermediate between two ‘worlds’ in order to reinforce his own position in the local 
arena. If new negotiation opportunities can emerge from this process, they do not 
therefore involve actors previously implicated in forestry management, namely the 
forest guard of the  Aı¨t Bougmez Valley and ‘normal’ villagers. It thus seems 
doubtful that this experiment could lead to effective changes in the forestry 
management system. But this statement can be extended to all the associations 
newly created in Aı¨t Bougmez. None of them has been able until now to take any
  
 
 
 
action in the field of forest resources management, and more generally natural 
resources management.
10  
At least two reasons can be advanced to explain it: 
 
• ‘Traditional’  institutions  are  still  in  charge  of  collective  pastureland  and 
irrigation system management.
11  
Management of the various natural resources is 
linked because of their complementarity in local farming systems, so it would 
seem inconsistent to have one resource managed by the association and others 
by traditional assemblies. 
• The local authority (the Caı¨d) wishes to preserve the existence of the Naı¨b,  a 
person chosen by Jmaˆa to monitor if its decisions are well enforced. The Caı¨d 
does not consider an association to be the equivalent to the Jmaˆa, because it does 
not express general interest as the Jmaˆa does: ‘Is the association in a position to 
work as the Jmaˆa does? It is not. This is because of the existence of customary 
rights,  over  which the  association  doesn’t  have  any  control’  (caı¨d  of  Aı¨t 
Bougmez). He tries to influence villages in favour of maintaining traditional 
rules. 
 
The context is thus characterized by the low legitimacy of local NGOs, which 
prevents them from taking any action concerning natural resource management. In 
such a context, the ministerial decree which relies on these NGOs to be put into 
practice is not likely to produce any effective change in local forestry management 
systems. Local NGOs might need to gain more legitimacy to be able to intervene, 
take part and modify current negotiations through which forestry management rules 
are set up and put into practice. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, the main intent of this paper is to show the results produced by a 
theoretical change of viewpoint from that of the new institutionalist approach to that 
of the SEMA framework. Using this framework, the paper explores the historical 
evolution and the ecological consequences of interaction patterns between local 
populations in the Ait Bougmez Valley and other actors, particularly from the 
forestry administration. It demonstrates that current forestry management results 
from negotiations between local populations and the forest guard who arrived in the 
valley in 1985. Both the forest legislation and the historical, traditional system of 
regulation are re-defined permanently as a result of these negotiations. The 
traditional system of regulation, in which the agdal rule plays an essential role, has 
thus not been completely abandoned, or outlawed by the forestry administration. It 
 
10   Two local NGOs (in the villages of Aı¨t Ouham and R’Bat) have expressed the wish to deal with forest 
management; the first tried to prevent villagers from cutting wood and to convince them of the benefits of 
replanting, and the other attempted to change rules concerning evergreen oak exploitation, but both were 
unsuccessful. 
11   Legal  associations  have  been  created  to  manage  irrigation  systems,  as  a  condition  of  their 
improvement being financed by the World Bank. However, up to the present they have never been able to 
take part in decisions concerning day-to-day water management, which remains the village assembly’s 
responsibility (Riaux 2006).
  
 
 
 
even continues to affect forests ecological condition and its evolution. Negotiations 
with the forestry administration have also produced environmental outcomes which 
cannot  be  ignored, in  particular the  reforestation of  contested  areas. However, 
substantial demographic pressure combined with the absence of economic 
alternatives to sylvopastoral production has led to severe forest depletion. Almost 
20% of the 1964 forest surface area has been completely deforested. 
The implementation of a new forest policy tool which aims at setting up 
contractual management between the forestry administration and these local 
populations has to be understood as an attempt to transform the local order. Such 
contractual management seeks to improve both the ecological outcomes of forest 
management and relationships between the local population and the forestry 
administration. It relies on the formalisation of local NGOs as the new interlocutors 
for the forestry administration. Up to now, however, these NGOs have not had access 
to negotiations defining forestry management rules. The impact of this new policy 
tool will remain limited as long as this situation lasts. As much as it took time for the 
forest guard arrival to provoke an effect on the local system, one can assume that it 
will take time for new negotiation opportunities which could lead to the definition of 
new local orders with different ecological outcomes. 
Such a diachronic and strategic analysis which takes more account of 
environmental consequences of actor inter-relationships is only possible because 
of the shift in theoretical and analytical approach adopted by this paper. A more 
standard  new  institutional  framework  would  have  led  to  a  focus  mainly  on 
traditional forest management and the disturbances provoked in it by the forest 
administration, instead of examining their interactions and their consequences. 
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